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ADVERTISING OF FOOD AND DRUGS:
CONCEALING A TRUTH, HINTING A LIE
... today's copywriters avoid clearly false statements. They tend
instead to use "those less obvious forms of falsehood which in
causitry and law are called suppressio verdi and suggestio falsi,
concealing a truth and hinting a lie, methods which certain types of
advertising have carried to pitch and skill that leaves us breathless."'
T HE FOCUS OF THIS COMMENT is on recent advertisements promoting
foods and drugs. Listed below are some representative ads, either
recently published in magazines, or broadcast on radio or television. The
question is whether they represent practices which, under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, are prohibited, or should be prohibited.
2
(1) The announcer narrates that "in a recent test" of pain relievers,
measuring their effectiveness against "pain other than headache," Excedrin
was found to be "significantly more effective" than common aspirin.
At the end of the ad, the announcer states, "Excedrin-more effective
against pain."
(2) The announcer states, "There's not much difference in pain
relievers that you can see, but in your bloodstream, the differences are
very real." He shows us a graph, which plots the level of pain relief of
several remedies, including Anacin. The graph shows that the "peaks" for
the "highest level" of pain relief of the other products comes earlier, but
that Anacin's peak, though coming later, is the highest. There is also a
lower level on the graph, marking what is called "effective level of pain
relief." The announcer observes that "while all three products reach an
effective level in minutes, in the final analysis, Anacin 'hits and holds the
'highest' level of pain relief. This difference is the added pain reliever that
Anacin provides." He closes the ad by stating, "Anacin relieves pain fast."
(3) An attractive young woman identifies herself as having a Ph.D.
She is shown serving Tang to her children. (Tang is a mixture that
includes sugar, orange flavoringq. vegetable gums, artificial colorings,
hardened coconut oil, and vitamins C and A. It is mixed with water, and
served in place of fruit juices.) The woman remarks that her children like
its taste, and she "like(s) the fact that it has so much vitamin C."
1 Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and
ludicial Reform, 17 KANS. L. REa. 625, 626 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Pollay],
citing D. MASTERS, THE INTELLImENT BUYERS GumE TO SELLERS 171 (1965).
2 Quotations from radio or television ads are based upon notes which were made while
the ads were broadcast. The quotes have been re-checked for accuracy. Statistics
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(4) The following are representative excerpts from ads for a product
called "Sugar in the Raw":
It contains all of its natural vitamins and minerals because it hasn't
been bleached, processed, and stripped of its natural goodness. It's
naturally blonde. Nothing is added-no chemicals. No preservatives.
Sugar in the Raw is naturally sweet-naturally delicious. Get back to
nature.... It's got no refinement, but Sugar in the Raw contains all
of its vitamins and minerals. It's naturally more nutritious-
From a printed advertisement: "It's got no refinement! Sugar in the
Raw. Organic! Unrefined! Natural! The honest to goodness sugar that
contains natural vitamins and minerals."
(5) Euell Gibbons, an author of several books on nature, describes
Post Grape Nuts Breakfast Cereal as his "back to nature cereal.... It is a
wholesome cereal.., made from natural wheat and barley. These natural
ingredients are baked into crunchy nuggets and fortified with vitamins.
Its naturally sweet taste reminds me of wild hickory nuts."
(6) Television viewers are shown a panorama of the Swiss Alps.
The announcer narrates, "From Switzerland, a land where the air is
incredibly pure, comes an old recipe" from which Alpen, a "natural"
ready-to-eat breakfast cereal, is inspired. He continues by describing the
cereal with such phrases as "full of natural goodness... pure and simple
... Alpen: wholesome and satisfying," while viewers are shown a family
of attractive, healthy looking blue-eyed blondes in a Swiss chalet-style
setting, enjoying their breakfast cereal. The ad does not disclose that
the cereal is made in England.
(7) A young wife is home, suffering from a cold. Her husband
returns with three different cold remedies. The wife objects, saying that
the first two have "an antitussive, an analgesic, and alcohol, not found in
Contac." The ad concludes by suggesting that it is preferable to take
Contac, instead of the other products, for Contac has to be taken less often.
(8) In another Contac ad, we are advised: "Give your allergy to
Contac," because one of the capsule's ingredients, an antihistamine, is
what doctors prescribe most often for hay fever sufferers.
(9) Two men are shown together in a living room. One of them has
a headache, and he asks his friend if he can give him something for it.
The friend gives him Arthritis Pain Formula. The suffering man protests,
"I have a headache, not arthritis." "Doesn't matter," his friend reassures
him, "read the label. A.P.F. is great for headaches, too." Later in the ad the
friend states, "A.P.F. has more pain reliever than most headache tablets."
(10) Whitehall Laboratories, makers of Arthritis Pain Formula, also
advertise another product, Anacin, as effective in relieving arthritis pain:
"Anacin has the pain reliever for arthritis most recommended by doctors."
(11) One friend suggests to another, that since she is "out of sorts,"
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and "not in the swing" because she "needs a laxative," she should get
Haley's M.O., for it is a "gentle acting laxative blend." The friend,
thinking out loud, says, "A laxative blend? I'll try it!"
(12) Sominex, in its latest series of ads, shows a young wife (with her
husband, Tom, standing behind her), calling up her mother, thanking
her for telling Tom about Sominex. In another ad, a mother and married
daughter are shown sitting on porch steps. The daughter has apparently
moved to the city; the mother, who lives in the country, has come for a
visit. The daughter tells her mother that "[she] did like you said, [and]
took Sominex" when she had trouble falling asleep. The mother approves.
In a third ad, kindly old "Uncle Ned," seated at a piano, sings a song
with a young couple. Gloria, the young woman, is Ned's niece. She
thanks her uncle for telling her about Sominex, which she now takes
when she has "occasional" trouble sleeping.
(13) An announcer begins an ad with the lines, "If you have trouble
falling asleep night after night, then maybe you should see your doctor;
but if you have only occasional trouble, then perhaps you'd like to know
about Sleep-Eze. It was tested in a hospital .... "
An advertisement may violate the Federal Trade Commission Act in
one of several ways. It may be an "unfair method of competition
in commerce," an "unfair or deceptive act of practice in commerce,"'3
or, in the specific cases of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics, an ad can
be considered "false" if it is "misleading in a material respect."4
One author has broken down the jurisdictional requirements, for an
advertiser to come under the Act, into three broad categories: - (1) The
party to be protected: this now includes both competitors, when victims
of "unfair methods of competition,"' 6 and consumers, who can either be
victims of "deceptive acts or practices,"'7 or "false" advertising.8 (2) In
commerce: this requirement has been held to exist under Section 45.9
Merely "affecting" commerce has been held to be insufficient.10 While
local activity is not covered under Section 45, it is suggested that when an
action is brought under Section 52," interstate advertising without
interstate sales provides a sufficient basis for F.T.C. jurisdiction. 2 (3)
3 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
4 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963). See also Slomoff, F.D.A.-F.T.C. Liaison: Teamwork
That Pays Off, 26 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 439 (1971).
5 See Note, False Advertising: The Expanding Presence of the F.T.C., 25 BAYLOR L.
REv. 650 (1973).
6 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
71d.
8 15 U.S.C. § 52, § 55 (1963).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
lo FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
1n 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1963).
12 Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1958); Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1958).
458 [Vol. 8:3
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Interest of the Public: Section 45 (b) 3 limits the Commission's jurisdiction
to cases in which "it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding...
would be to the interest of the public." This requirement has been called
"a prerequisite to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Commission rather
than a test of [the] propriety of issuing a cease and desist order."'1 4 Among
the factors demonstrating the public interest in "false" advertising are the
substantial volume of the advertiser's business,15 the presence or absence
of a probability of deception of the public,'8 a threat to the health of
the public,17 a diversion of business from those not engaging in "false"
advertising,'8 or a violation of Trade Practice Rules. 9
In addition to what is outlined in the statute, the following general
rules have been recognized: It is sufficient that the ad have a "capacity" or
"tendency" to deceive. 20 It is not necessary to prove "actual deception."21
An ad is deceptive, even if it would only deceive those who are careless
or gullible.22 "In adjudging the falsity of advertising representations,
regard must be had, not to finespun distinctions and arguments that may
be made in excuse, but to the effect which such representations might
reasonably be expected to have on the general public."'3 Ambiguous
'3 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
14 See Barnes, The Law of Trade Practices: False Advertising, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 597,
656 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Barnes]. The author cites Northern Feather Works
v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1956); FrC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
15 International Parts Corp. v. FTC, 133 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1943). (Cases cited
in notes 15 through 19 can be found in Barnes, supra note 14, at 656-7.)
1
6Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, & Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1951); Irwin
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 316, 325 (8th Cir. 1944); Arnold Stone Co. v. FTC, 49 F.2d 1017
(5th Cir. 1931).
'7 Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953).
Is Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
668 (1941); Alberty v. FTC, 118 F.2d 669, 670 (9th Cir. 1941); FTC v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922).
19 Prima Products v. FTC, 209 F.2d 405,407-8 (2d Cir. 1954).
20 FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1936)..
21FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928).
22 There have been many descriptions of the standard which should be used: "Laws
are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious." FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937). The F.T.C. Act was made for the protection of
"... the public-the vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and
the credulous." Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143, F.2d 676, 679 (2d
Cir. 1944). In FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674, the court cites
1 CALLMAN, UNFARm CoMPETrroI AND TAEMawKS § 19.2(a) (1), at 341-44 (1950)
(and cases cited therein):
The general public has been defined as "that vast multitude which includes the
ignorant, and the unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do
not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions." The average purchaser has been variously characterized as not
"straight tn ," subject to "impressions," uneducated, and grossly mis-
inormed; he is influenced by prejudice and superstition; and he wishfully
believes in miracles, allegedly the result of progress in science.... The language
of the ordinary purchaser is casual and unaffected. He is not an "expert in
grammatical construction" or an "educated analytical reader" and, therefore, he
does not normally subject every word in the advertisement to careful study.
23 U.S. Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 1962).
COMMENTS
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/9
AKRON LAW REVIEW
statements, susceptible of both a misleading and truthful interpretation,
will be construed against the advertiser.24 Failure to disclose a "material"
fact will make an ad deceptive.25 "A statement may be deceptive even if
the constituent words may be literally true or technically construed so as
not to constitute a misrepresentation."' 21 It is not necessary to find a
deliberate intent to deceive.27 It is not necessary to find that the advertiser
had knowledge of the falsity of his claim.
26
The Commission has great discretion in determining the meaning of
an ad,29 but it must prove that the meaning is false. The evidence usually
consists of testimony of Commission experts, surveys, and trade witnesses.
30
While, as a practical matter, courts are hesitant to overturn a decision of
the F.T.C. as to what constitutes a deceptive practice (should the
advertiser decide to appeal the Commission decision),31 the advertiser, on
2
4 Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962).
2"To tell less than the whole truth is a well known method of deception; and he who
deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the deception by relying upon the
truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been accomplished." P.
Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
26 Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025
(1957).
27 Bokenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943).
28 D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
29 In Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L.
REV. 439, 470 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Millstein], it is written:
A review of the cases demonstrates that generally the Commission will find that
an advertisement promises what the Commission itself believes it promises,
notwithstanding dictionary definitions, the testimony of consumers and experts,
or the results of surveys. The Commission always seems able to find one rule or
another that can justify its determination of meaning. Furthermore, the courts
seem quite willing in most instances to uphold the Commission's view of the
promise.
(For further reference, and cases cited, see Millstein at 470-78.)
01Id. at 478-80; see also Gellhorn, Proof of Deception Before the Federal Trade
Commission, 17 KANS. L. REv. 559, 563 (1969); Note, Developments in the Law:
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
Consumers are, quite predictably, at a disagreement over what constitutes
"false" or deceptive advertising. One study concluded that "while it is quite likely
that persons are as opposed to misleading advertising as they are to sin, it is equally
likely that they have vastly different notions as to what constitutes misleading
advertising." Pollay, supra note 1, citing Kottman, A Semantic Evaluation of Mislead-
ing Advertising, 14 J. CoMMUmCATION 151, 154 (1964).
Travers, Foreword to Symposium: Federal Trade Commission Regulation of
Deceptive Advertising, 17 KANS. L. REv. 551, 554 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Travers], cites BAUER AND GEYSER, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE CONSUMER VIEW
331, 333 (1968), which concluded that the majority of those polled "were more
favorable than unfavorable toward the institution of advertising. Significantly, the
major reason given for these approving attitudes was the informational value of
advertising." On the other hand, Anderson and Winer, Corrective Advertising: The
F.T.C.'s New Formula for Effective Relief, 50 TEX. L. REv. 312, 321 (1972), cite
sources in notes 48 and 49, which suggest that most people do not believe the claims
made by advertisements.
31In FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 375, 385 (1965), the late Chief Justice
Warren wrote: "As an administrative agency which deals continually with cases in the
area, the Commission is often in a better position than are the courts to determine
when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the [F.T.C.] Act."
[Vol. 8:3
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the other hand, is able to delay complying with the Commission order for
years, while his case is on appeal.3 2 During this time, he is free to continue
running his allegedly deceptive ads. The Commission, in the past few
years, has devised the remedy of "corrective advertising" to help
counteract the effects of prolonged advertising deception.
33
Materiality: The idea that the representation must be materially
deceptive is not directly expressed in Section 45(a),34 but is mentioned
in Section 55(a)(1), in cases of "false" advertising of foods, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics.35 It has been observed that courts have required
even "unfair and deceptive practices" under Section 45(a) to stem from
material misrepresentations.3 6 In F.T.C. v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,37 the
Courts usually uphold F.T.C. actions unless it is proved that the Commission
acted arbitrarily (Carter Products, Inc., v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 497 [9th Cir.], cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 [1959]), clearly abused its discretion (Independent Directory
Corp. v. FTC, 188 F.2d 468, 470 [2d Cir. 1951]), or failed to make an allowable
judgment in its choice of remedies (Carter Products, Inc., v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821, 826
[7th Cir. 1951]).
32 It took 15 years, for example, for the F.T.C. to take "liver" out of "Carter's Little
Liver Pills."
33 The remedies which the F.T.C. can impose are essentially the following:
(1) Cease and desist order: An order requiring the advertiser to stop publishing
or broadcasting those ads, or similar ads, which have been found to be deceptive,
unfair, or false.
(2) Affirmative Disclosure: A requirement that, in future ads, certain informa-
tion be included, without which, the ad's representations would have a material
omission.
(3) Corrective Advertising: "To verbalize retractions to the effect that [the
advertiser] has falsely advertised in the past, and is now correcting the false
impression." (Definition from Note, False Advertising: The Expanding Presence of
the F.T.C., 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 650, 653-4 (1973).
For further reference on corrective advertising, see Note, Corrective Advertising,
85 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1971); Note, Corrective Advertising and the F.T.C., 70 MICH.
L. REv. 374 (1971); Anderson and Winer, Corrective Advertising: The F.T.C.'s New
Formula for Effective Relief, 50 TEx. L. Rav. 312 (1972); Note, Corrective Adver-
tising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1972).
For a comparison of actions under the F.T.C. Act and the common law, see
Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the F.T.C., 24 FED. BAR J. 548 (1964).
34 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
35 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).
s6 See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-7 (1933); Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe, & Jack, Inc., v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Note,
"Extrinsic Misrepresentation" in Advertising Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1966).
37 380 U.S. 374 (1965). This case involved the infamous Rapid Shave sandpaper
shaving demonstration. The cream could shave sandpaper, but only after soaking the
paper in water for 80 minutes. The demonstration in the ad did not disclose that
fact, and indeed, the demonstration did not show the cream actually shaving
sandpaper, ostensibly because sandpaper does not photograph faithfully. A "mock-up"
using sand and plexiglass was used instead. When is "deception" from a "mock-up" to
be considered materially deceptive? Ice cream, for example, cannot be photographed
under hot studio lights, and so mashed potatoes are usually substituted. That is not
considered to be materially deceptive. The explanation of the holding in the Rapid
Shave case is best expressed in Note, "Extrinsic Misrepresentation" in Advertising
Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 36, at 732, as
Spring, 1975] COMMENTS 461
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United States Supreme Court held that a misrepresentation can be
material not only if it relates to the product, but also if it materially
induces the purchase of the product.
Public Injury-Public Interest: Although an ad may be deceptive,
courts will usually look to see if there exists a "public interest" in stopping
the advertising. 8 This sometimes results in the consideration of a different,
though related question: what potential injury may result from the
deception? While this would usually involve financial injury, courts
have also held that there is sufficient injury when a consumer is "tricked"
into buying a product.3s
Defenses: There are certain defenses which an advertiser might
plead, when an action is brought against him under the F.T.C. Act. It
appears, though, that an advertiser may still find it difficult to prevail
against an F.T.C. complaint.1°
follows: "Rapid Shave's hypothetical ability to shave sandpaper as portrayed was
irrelevant, for only after they were led to believe that this feat was actually being
performed before their eyes did many persons decide to buy the product."
In Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818
(1959), it was held that a material issue could be raised "at least in part upon
il-founded sentiment, belief or caprice." The case involved an advertiser's failure to
disclose, in its ads, that its motor oil was "used" oil that had been re-refined. While
the oil was identical, chemically, to "new" oil, the court held that consumers would
prefer "new" as opposed to "used" oil, and should be advised in advertisements that
the oil promoted was not "new."
Other examples of materiality based upon "popular" consumer preferences
include:
L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951), which held that it was an
unfair trade practice not to disclose in advertising that imitation pearls were imported,
since Americans were deemed to have a preference for domestically produced goods.
Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 48 F.T.C. 155 (1951), held that a producer of
goosefeathers must disclose the fact that they were used, as purchasers were deemed
to prefer new feathers.
3 8 See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
39 See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); FTC v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1933);
Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963); Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d
246 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, &
Jack Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941); FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 620
(2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928).
40 (1) Puffing: " 'Puffing' refers, generally, to an expression of opinion not made as
a representation of fact.... While a seller has some latitude in 'puffing' his goods, he
is not authorized to misrepresent them or to assign to them benefits or virtues they
do not possess." Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
(2) Truth: "Words and sentences may be literally and technically true and yet
be framed in such a setting as to mislead or deceive." Bockensette v. FTC, 134 F.2d
369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943); See also P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.
1950).
(3) No prejudice to public:
The consumer is prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied
with something else.... In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it
chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps
by ignorance.... Dealers and manufacturers are prejudiced when orders that
would have come to them if the lumber had been rightfully named, are diverted
to others whose methods are less scrupulous.
[Vol. 8:3
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Unfairness: Section 45(a) 41 refers to "unfair" methods, acts, or
practices in commerce. Gerald Thain, Assistant Director for National
Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission,
has observed that the Commission traditionally has attacked only unfair
methods of competition, "in the anti-trust sense," 42 but he urges that
"unfairness" under the Act should also be used to attack advertising
which is unfair to consumers. (Misleading advertising, for example, has
been held to be "unfair" in its effect, but only in the sense that it puts
honest competitors at a disadvantage.) 43
Thain has also pointed out that actions based on simple deception
were adequate in the past, but advertisers, he observes, have become more
sophisticated in their techniques of persuasion, requiring the development
of new actions and remedies, to protect consumers and competitors. 44 He
feels that actions based on "unfairness" may provide the solution. President
Kennedy, in his 1962 Consumer Message to Congress, outlined what he
referred to as "consumer rights": (1) The right to safety; (2) The right
to be informed; (3) The right to choose; (4) The right to be heard. Under
the "right to be informed" are included the following significant words of
elaboration: "... and to be given the facts [needed] to make an informed
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 219 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1934) (selling "yellow" pine as
"white" pine).
(4) No deceit of the public: "Advertisements are intended not 'to be carefully
dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an impression upon prospec-
tive purchasers.'" Positive Products Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
(5) Early disclosure: In Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821, 822-24 (7th
Cir. 1951), it was held that the advertiser could not claim that his product was
effective in stopping perspiration for one to three days, but then indicate on the label
directions that a person should apply the product as often as necessary-a direction
which indicated, as the court found, that the product was not as effective as the
representations had claimed.
(6) No cure claimed: Some ads strongly imply that their products will cure an
ailment. The advertiser defends by arguing that such a claim was never actually made,
but that argument is not strong, in the light of the F.T.C.'s ability to interpret an ad's
meaning. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1953).
(7) Statements of opinion made in good faith: The impression left with viewers,
and not the advertiser's good faith, will determine if there is a misrepresentation.
See Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953) at 316-17.
This list is derived from Barnes, supra note 14, and is not an exhaustive list of
all possible defenses. For a more thorough compilation, see 2 TRADE REO. REP.
7533, and further sections cited therein.
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
42 Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., 26 FooD DRUO
CosM. L.J. 487, 495 (1971).
43 In FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942), the Court held: "[W]hen the
Commission finds as it did here that misleading and deceptive statements were made
with reference to the quality of merchandise it is also authorized to infer that trade
will be diverted from competitors who do not engage in such 'unfair methods.'' "
44 Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The F.T.C. Response, 27 Bus. LAW. 891,
902 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thain].
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choice."' 45 The White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health
added a fifth "right": The right to proper food and proper nourishment. 46
The idea of unfairness has thus been described to be a broad
concept,47 and it has been interpreted to mean that advertisers should give
consumers adequate information about their products, to enable consumers
to make rational choices. This usual lack of information upon which to
make a rational decision is also related to the idea that, in many fields
(and certainly including food and drugs), advertisers seek to "create"
through their ads differences between virtually identical products.
48
Also condemned are ads which are said to evoke "moods"; ads
which are capable of persuading consumers to ignore such "rational
considerations as the price, or quality of the thing which is promoted.
4 9
45 Morse, A Consumer's View of F.T.C. Regulation of Advertising, 17 KANS. L. REv.
639, 640 (1969), cites CONSUMERS' PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAMS, H.R. Doc.
No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
4 See Thain, supra note 44, at 610.
It is ironic to recall FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
The F.T.C., in contemplation of bringing actions against various drug manufacturers
for their advertising of analgesics, conducted an independent study which suggested
that aspirin was as effective as other more elaborate "combination of ingredients"
products. The makers of Bayer Aspirin attempted to publish the study, to promote
their product. The F.T.C. attempted to stop them, claiming that such a study might
be interpreted by some consumers as an official endorsement of aspirin.
47 See Note, Corrective Advertising, 85 HARv. L. REv. 477, 495 (1971).
48Ralph Nader describes this as "competitive ferocity over profound trivia." See
Austern, What Is Unfair Advertising? 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 659, 665 (1971).
It is revealing to examine the advertising/sales ratios of different commodities,
as compiled by Greer, Product Differentiation and Drug Mergers (I1), 4 ANTI-TRUST
L. & EcoN. REV. 63 (1971):
Advertising/Sales Ratios in Non-Drug Industries (of products capable of
"product differentiation"):
Beer ............... 9% Breakfast cereals ....... 15-18%
Cigarettes ............. 10% Soft drinks .......... about" 10%
Soap ............... 10% Electrical appliances ....... 13%
In Drugs:
Bristol-Myers Sterling Drug
(Bufferin) ........... 27.6% (Phillips, Bayer) ...... 21.6%
Warner-Lambert Miles Laboratories
(Pharmaceuticals) ..... .16.8% (Alka-Seltzer) ........ 24.0%
In Travers, supra note 30, at 555, it is observed:
According to Cox, FELLMUTH, AND SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE F.T.C.
App. 3 (1969), the following were the first-quarter television advertising
expenditures of 1968 for the following products:
Anacin ..... .. ................... $4,618,500
Bayer Aspirin ...... ................. 3,110,500
Bufferin ....... ................... 2,929,500
In 1967, the F.T.C. received an appropriation of $14,378,000. Of this
amount, $6,846,000 was allocated to stopping deceptive practices (ld. App. 1).
This latter figure is less than the combined television advertising budget for
Anacin and Bayer during the first quarter of 1968.49 See Thain, supra note 44, at 902.
No F.T.C. actions against an advertiser for using "mood" to promote a product
have been found, but possible examples of such ads might be:
Sominex (ad number [12]): These ads promote a "mood" of respectability, in
[Vol. 8:3
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Some "non-rational" ads have been characterized as ads which play
on consumers' emotions, needs, and fears. 50 One case which has been
cited to show the F.T.C.'s new disposition to attack advertisements which
use such techniques is the "Vivarin" decision. 51 J. B. Williams was
promoting its caffeine stimulant as a "new" product which housewives
should take, to prevent feeling tired, so that they could become more
sexually alluring to their husbands. The ads did not even disclose that
caffeine was the active ingredient.
52
In F.T.C. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co.,5 a case not directly dealing
with unfairness in advertising, there is printed, in a note, a set of guidelines
for unfairness which seem to be applicable to advertising:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining
whether a practice which is neither in violation of the antitrust laws
nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some
common law, statutory, or other established concept of fairness;
(2) Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen).'
The list of factors, particularly in (2) and (3), might be interpreted
as very broad indeed.5
promoting a sleeping aid, a product which many people undoubtedly have negative
feelings about.
Alpen: (ad number [6]): An idyllic mood of mountainous Switzerland seems to
be stressed as much as the breakfast cereal.
50 See Thain, supra, note 44, at 902.
51 J. B. Williams Co., 81 F.T.C. 238 (1972).
52 Gerald Thain, in Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the
F.T.C., 26 FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 487, 499 (1971), remarks:
Although the Vivarin complaint proceeds on the theory that the advertising is
false and misleading, I personally feel that the use of the challenged ads comes
very close to what I would define as an unfair practice. I would question the
fairness of any ad which exploits the aspirations of married women by
representing that a product such as Vivarin, can and will be effective in making
them attractive and exciting to their husbands.
53 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
54 Id. at 244-5, n.5.
W For a less optimistic assessment of the value of the enumerated factors, see Note,
Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, Wisc. L. Rav. 1097,
1108 (1972). Thain, supra note 44, at 899, argues:
In the past, the "Unfairness Doctrine" has been used mainly to attack actual
practices, rather than advertising, and usually these practices have been so
blatantly inequitable or coercive as to evince actual intent to defraud consumers.
.. There is nothing inherent in the meaning of the term "unfair act or practice,"
however, that limits it to this type of activity. Just as the term "deceptive acts
or practices" has been construed to include false advertising, so the term "unfair
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ADVERTISEMENTS (1) THROUGH (13) IN RELATION TO F.T.C. STANDARDS
Food and drugs, when taken wisely, will promote good health, but
misleading or unfair advertising of food and drugs resembles an infectious
disease in some ways. Like any other disease, such advertising is all too
capable of impairing one's health. Such advertising, with its half truths,
incorrect conclusions, enticing pictures and jingles, attractive settings,
layouts, models, contagious humor, and exaggerated claims, attacks
unwary consumers, with the likely result that they will be persuaded
to buy products for the wrong reasons. Advertisers may convince a
consumer to buy or take a drug for an "ailment" that needs no treatment
with drugs. Consumers, by buying one product, may be precluded from
getting something else which would actually be better.56 Consumers,
by "treating only a symptom" which they have been encouraged to
self-diagnose, may mask the seriousness of their afliction.5 7
Misleading advertising of food and drugs is also much like a disease
in the sense that it constantly appears in new forms. The possibility
exists, that with each new advertising campaign for a product, an
advertiser can portray the product in some misleading or unfair way. As
medical researchers constantly attempt to identify new strains of diseases,
and develop new vaccines to immunize against them, so, it seems, that
it is necessary constantly to examine food and drug advertising, to see if
some new strain of some old advertising malady is present, and to
determine what measures are appropriate to deal with the "infection."
One further point should be emphasized: The F.T.C., in its
deliberations, is concerned with questions of fact, as opposed to questions
of law. The Commission, in advertising cases, seems to concentrate most
For criticisms of the idea of an expanded doctrine of unfairness, see Austern,
What Is Unfair Advertising? supra note 48; Austern, What Is Unfair Advertising?
A Discussion of Consumer Advertising from the Point of View of the Consumer, the
Government, and Industry, 27 Bus. LAW. 883 (1972); Charlton, Food Advertising
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 27 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 226 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Charlton].
56 See, e.g., Note, Corrective Advertising and the F.T.C., 70 MiCH. L. REv. 374 (1971).
For a collection of surveys which suggest how poorly fed Americans are, see
Baxter, Nutritional Labeling: An Analysis, 26 FooD DRUO CosM. L.J. 82 (1971).
Peterson, Informative Labeling as a Consumer Guide, 27 FOOD DRUO CosM.
L.J. 70 (1972), offers statistics which suggest that children see only ads for "fun" or
"junk" foods. The question which this suggests is whether parents see ads for foods
which are nutritionally much better.
Charlton, supra note 55, complains, on behalf of the food industry, that the
F.T.C. hasn't given the industry any guidelines in the past, and did not even have
until recently a nutritionist on its scientific staff.
"The gaps in our public knowledge about nutrition, along with actual misinfor-
mation carried by some media, are contributing seriously to the problem of hunger
and malnutrition in the United States.' Thain, supra note 44, at 892, citing WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NuTrrIoN, AND HEALTH: FINAL REPORT (1969) at 179.
57See, e.g., J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 549 (1965). Brennan, Affirmative
Disclosure in Advertising and Control of Packaging Design Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 20 Bus. LAW. 133 (1964).
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on determining the meaning or implication of the representations. It then
usually refers to the F.T.C. Act, to hold that the representations violate
some portion of the statute. The Commission rarely if ever cites to court
decisions, or to prior F.T.C. decisions, for it is unnecessary to cite any
precedent to make a factual finding. Questions of law, and the issue of
possible abuse of discretion by the Commission, are appealed to the
federal courts, if the advertiser wishes to pursue his case. Most of
the F.T.C. decisions are not appealed, and thus it would seem that many
questions of law that are raised in them are left unanswered.
The discussion of the ads that follow concentrates on finding the
meaning or implication of the ads, for that is the way that the F.T.C.
would consider them. Unlike in F.T.C. decisions, comparisons are
provided with F.T.C. cases dealing with similar advertising problems. The
other cases also 'help to point out that certain kinds of advertising practices
have not been, but probably should be considered by the Commission.
Each of the 13 ads described earlier, in this writer's opinion, is either
misleading, or is otherwise unfair. Others may not agree with some of the
writer's assessments, 58 but this Comment will hopefully offer strong
reasons why these ads should be construed as in violation of the F.T.C.
Act. The fact that these ads, and similar ads, have been permitted to be
published or aired, strongly suggests that the F.T.C. still has much
unfinished work ahead of it before food and drug advertising is free
of serious improprieties.
Faulty conclusions: In the first two examples, the ads reach, on the
basis of information given to viewers, conclusions which hardly seem
warranted. Number (1) is just one of several ads in a series which
seem to try, consistently, to confuse viewers into believing that the tests
concluded that Excedrin was proved to be "significantly more effective"
against any kind of pain, compared against any other product. For those
who will remember the vague qualification, "pain other than headache,"
the ad might still be potentially dangerous. A mother, for example, might
take the ad to mean that Excedrin is suitable to use to relieve her child's
pain from an upset stomach. A product containing aspirin, as Excedrin
does, may actually increase stomach pain, rather than relieve it, as aspirin
often upsets the taker's stomach, as a side effect. The argument, that the
user should read the directions on the label, should be no defense in this
instance. 59 A person could conceivably buy the product for stomach upset,
only to realize later that it is not the right medication to take.
The Anacin ad (Number [2]) is puzzling on its surface, and becomes
even more confusing as it is considered further. It suggests that viewers
should not be satisfied merely with a pain reliever which gives them an
"effective level of pain relief" in minutes. Instead, we should take Anacin,
58 See Barnes, supra note 14, at 618.
59 See Travers, supra note 30.
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because it, later on, "hits and holds the highest level of pain relief." Whether
that means that it is any more "effective," by Anacin's own definition, is
not clear. The reason why Anacin reaches its "higher level," we are told,
is apparently because it contains more pain reliever per dosage. The
difference, then, is one of strength, as opposed to "effectiveness." Presum-
ably, if Anacin is better because it is stronger, we could achieve the same
result with the other products, simply by taking more of them.60 The ad
closes, paradoxically, with the old familiar slogan, "Anacin relieves pain
fast," but the graph shown in the ad, on the other hand, proved that the
other two products reached an "effective level" before Anacin did.6'
The question not answered is: of what significance is it that Anacin
60 See Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).
61 After running this ad for several months, it was revised slightly to end -... and
Anacin relieves pain fast." Even with the conjunctive, this statement can hardly be
said to follow logically from the data on the graph.
(Anacin recently introduced a new series of ads, which features endorsements
from professional people. In one ad, Mrs. Loftus, who identifies herself as a college
teacher, says that she takes Anacin when "[she] has a headache... [for] there's
something in it that works [emphasis added]." The announcer interjects, "That's right,
Mrs. Loftusi" and he then gives the same confusing explanation for Anacin's
"superiority" that was used in ad number [2]. Anacin's supposed "superiority," of
course, is due to its greater strength per dosage, and is not due to any "miracle
ingredient" which Mrs. Loftus infers is present.)
The most recent, comprehensive action by the Commission against advertisements
of pain relievers was taken, astonishingly, over 13 years ago. See American Home
Products Corp., 67 F.T.C. 430 (1961). The F.T.C. there found that drug manufac-
turers had made the following false representations:
Speed:
(1) "Anacin acts with such incredible speed as to provide relief of [sic]
pain faster than any other analgesic preparation available and offered to
consumers."
(2) "Bufferin provides relief from pain twice as fast as aspirin."(3) "St. Joseph Aspirin provides relief of [sic] pain faster than any other
analgesic preparation available and offered for sale to consumers."(4) "Bayer Aspirin works faster than any other analgesic preparation
available and offered for sale to consumers."(5) "Bayer Aspirin for Children works faster than any other children's
analgesic preparation available and offered for sale to consumers."
Tension:
(1) "Anacin relaxes tension."
2) "Bufferin relieves tension."
3) "Excedrin relieves tension."
Depression:
(1) "Anacin helps overcome depression."
(2) "Excedrin acts as an anti-depressant."
Strength:
"Excedrin is an extra-strength pain reliever, is 50% stronger than aspirin,
and that two Excedrin tablets equal three ordinary pain tablets."
Relief from Swelling:
"Excedrin will combat the cause of pain by reducing the swelling of tissue."
The Commission decided to withdraw the complaints in 1965, apparently
because it felt that the proceedings had become bogged down from delays (see 67
F.T.C. at 448-449). The claims made in ads (1) and (2), cited in the text, are much
more subtle than the claims made in the ads cited in the Commission's complaint:
Excedrin no longer claims that it relieves tension, acts as an anti-depressant, or relieves
tissue swelling; Excedrin now simply is claimed to be "more effective" against "pain
other than headache." Anacin does not claim now that it works faster than other
over-the-counter analgesics, or that it relaxes tension or helps overcome depression;
Anacin is promoted simply as "better" because it is "stronger."
[Vol. 8:3
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is stronger? What the ad really implies, is that a "stronger" medication is
a "better" medication. A weak remedy is an inferior remedy. More
strength means more relief.62 (It is worth noting generally, also, that ads
which boast of a drug's monumental "strength" per dosage, do not seem
62 The F.T.C. apparently does not share this writer's opinion, that drugs should not
be advertised as more "effective" because they are stronger. Thain, Drug Advertising
and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., supra note 52, at 491, cites the F.T.C.
Proposed Rule of July 5, 1967, for the advertising of non-prescription analgesic drugs.
Proposed Rule number (2) seems to say that it is permissible for an ad to claim that
a drug is "more effective" because of its greater strength, as long as it is disclosed
that its greater "effectiveness" is attributable to the increase in dosage. This position,
it is submitted, enables drug advertisers to reenforce the notion, in consumer minds,
that "stronger" is always "better."
What then, are the limits which the F.T.C. has imposed on drug advertisers?
The answers are found in bits and pieces, in F.T.C. Complaints. In the last ten
years, the Commission has decided the following:
(1) No drug ad should encourage consumers to "self-diagnose" an ailment.
J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965). The makers of Geritol encouraged people
to diagnose tiredness as iron deficiency anemia, when only a physician could
accurately determine if a person is suffering from such anemia.
(2) Ads should not imply that a product will "cure" an ailment, if the product
in fact only treats its symptom(s). Merk & Co., 69 F.T.C. 526 (1966). The makers of
Sucrets represented that their lozenges would kill "even staph and strep germs on
contact." The Commission decided that statement implied that Sucrets would cure
diseases caused by those infections. The Commission found that while the lozenges did
kill staph and strep "germs" on contact, the lozenges only killed them on the surface
of the throat. Therefore, the preparation could only provide temporary relief.
(3) Drug ads should not encourage "self-medication." Bristol Myers Co., 74
F.T.C. 780 (1968). The F.T.C. found that the makers of Bufferin advertised that
medical tests showed that Bufferin reduced swelling and inflamation, increased joint
movement, and improved grip strength of arthritis sufferers. The ad continued, "If
you have arthritis, you should be under a doctor's care, even in the early stages.
If your doctor prescribes Bufferin, it's good to know you can take it without the
stomach upset other drugs often cause. Bufferin, a leader in arthritis research."
The Commission complained that the ad failed to disclose that, in the tests, the
drug was administered in "near toxic doses" (74 F.T.C. at 853) to achieve the results
indicated. The Commission went on to conclude,
Despite its carefully hedged language, there can be little doubt that this adver-
tisement was not intended solely to report the conclusions [of the tests] but was
also intended, or at least would tend, to induce arthritis sufferers to purchase
Bufferin-that is, to encourage arthritics to engage in self-medication.... The
advertisement was published in two magazines of general circulation; and,despite its studied ambiguity, its principal impact is to suggest that costly
treatment may be unnecessary since Bufferin, a product available over the
counter, is useful for treating the disease.
(4) Advertisers must be prepared to substantiate all claims made in their ads.
Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Note,
The Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers but a Headache for
Advertisers, 1973 DuKE L.J. 563 (1973).
(5) It may be "false" advertising to imply that a product designed to treat one
kind of symptom, will bring benefits to the user in other, unrelated ways. J. B.
Williams Co., 81 F.T.C. 238 (1972). The makers of Vivarin, a caffeine stimulant,
were found to have represented falsely that their product would "make one more
exciting and attractive, improve one's personality, marriage and sex life, and will solve
marital and other personal problems." (81 F.T.C. at 242). One F.T.C. official has
argued that the ad should have been attacked as "unfair," instead of as "false and
misleading." See note 52 supra.
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to emphasize the risk of overdosage as prominently.63) The Anacin ad
would have made more sense, and would have avoided reinforcing the
dangerous myth about "strength" always being desirable, by stating, for
example, "Don't buy Anacin simply because they're stronger, but if you
find that you need a stronger pain reliever than the type you may
presently be using, then try Anacin." 64
Testimonial: Ad number (3), for Tang Instant Breakfast Drink,
involves a very unusual kind of testimonial. The housewife identifies herself
as having a Ph.D., and then tells viewers about the supposed virtues of
Tang. How should viewers react to the disclosure of her educational
status? Would it in any way encourage them to buy the product, and if
so, for what reasons? Would those reasons be valid or "rational" ones?
Has anything been misrepresented in the ad, assuming that the woman
does, in fact, have a Ph.D.? It would seem to be no coincidence that the
woman selected to do the ad has an unusual, "esteemed" status.
65
The endorsement here could not be called a "collective endorsement,"
for it is not implied, nor would it seem that many viewers would infer,
from the ad, that all, or even many Ph.D. holders endorse Tang. On the
other hand, the ad is not, in its effect, a personal endorsement, either.
Such an endorsement would be made by an individual who is known and
respected65 (i.e., a baseball player,67 a movie star, or astronauts, as used in
63 It is true, that older ads for sleeping aids warned, "Take only as directed. Avoid
excessive use." Most products today use a more general warning, such as Bayer's, "As
with all medications, take only as directed," or, as Lloyd Bridges would mention on
radio ads for Contac, "Take Contac only as directed, and only when you know
you need it."
64 Another "consumer myth" may be involved with drug ads which stress strength:
"two tablets are all you should ever take." Drug manufacturers "get around" this
myth simply by increasing the dosage per tablet, and then claim that their product is
superior because it is "stronger." The consumer stays happy, by taking his two
"stronger" tablets, convinced that they are really superior to the "weaker" tablets he
had been taking "two of" before.
6 5 Recall how the earlier ads stressed how Tang was used in the Apollo Space
Program. Since that N.A.S.A. program has now ended, it would stand to reason that
the advertisers would try to find a suitable "substitute" for astronauts. In another
recent ad for Tang, featuring a woman who appears to be a commercial airlines pilot
as well as a mother, the woman says, "When Stan [her young son] heard that Tang
went to the moon, he said, 'Let's try it'!"
6
6 Readers may be surprised to learn that Eleanor Roosevelt made an ad for Imperial
Margarine in the late 1950's! (Recent Imperial ads show husbands or wives wearing
huge crowns after tasting the spread's "fit for a king" flavor.) The money Mrs.
Roosevelt earned for her testimonial was donated to a United Nations fund, although
that was not disclosed in the ad.
67 The closest, most recent F.T.C. case involving a testimonial of a food product is
Beatrice Foods Co. 81 F.T.C. 830 (1972). Baseball player Lou Brock appeared in a
series of ads for Holloway's Milk Duds. The Commission decided that the ads were
"false, misleading or deceptive" because "the consumption of confectionaries such
as 'Holloway's Milk Duds' is not linked to or necessary for the instilling, improving
or maintaining of athletic ability or performance. Instead, said endorsements are based
upon a monetary relationship... and not upon any nutritional superiority or
attribute of said product."
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the earlier Tang ads), and whose personal association with a product
would prompt consumers to buy it. In the Tang ad, since the woman is
not a well known figure, one can only conclude that the advertiser is trying
to suggest that a word of approval from a holder of some sort of advanced
degree is a valid reason for consumers to buy his breakfast drink.
It may be argued that the ad is "false" under Section 55(a) (1) of
the F.T.C. Act, "to the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal
facts material in the light of such representations." 68 By this rationale,
the "material omission" would be the undisclosed reason why an otherwise
anonymous Ph.D. holder approves of a product. The fact would seem to
be a material fact,69 and not disclosing it simply leaves viewers to draw
possibly faulty conclusions that such an endorsement necessarily means
that the product is recognized as desirable by an expert in the field, or
that it is preferable to other breakfast drinks or juices. 70
The "Natural" Foods: Numbers (4) through (6) are examples of ads
promoting "natural" foods. The most salient point, at least from the
advertiser's standpoint, is that to call anything "natural" is to say
something good about it; something that, in some mysterious way,
registers a positive impression with consumers and apparently motivates
them to buy.7n But what, exactly, does "natural" mean? Different
advertisers have different ideas. "Sugar in the Raw" was promoted as
"natural" and "organic," because it was claimed that it had no
preservatives, and because it was "unrefined." 7 2 Post Cereals, on the other
hand, promotes its Grape Nuts as a "back to nature cereal." A close
reading of Euell Gibbons' description in ad number (5) would seem to
suggest that since wheat and barley are "natural," that is enough, by
implication, to make the cereal natural when those grains are baked. The
reference, however, to "fortifying" Grape Nuts with vitamins suggests that
there are additional ingredients that are not, indeed, "natural." The
Quaker Oats Co. offers, on the side of its package for Quaker 100%
Natural Cereal, the following interesting information:
Natural foods should not be confused with organic foods generally
represented to be grown without aid of artificial fertilizers and
without pesticides.
68 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).
69 See FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965), and text accompanying
note 37 supra.
70In Erikson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940
(1960), the advertiser was prohibited from using ads which pictured men "attired in
a type of white jacket customarily worn and associated with members of the medical
profession." It is arguable that a Ph.D.'s endorsement, to many viewers, might be the
equivalent of a medical doctor's approval.
71 It is amusing to recall that advertisers have not always promoted "natural" as
necessarily "desirable." George Washington Hill, in 1931, for example, created a
flamboyant ad campaign for Lucky Strike Cigarettes, which claimed that Lucky
Strike's "Toasting" process removes "sheep-dip base" found naturally in all tobacco
leaf. See LEWlm, GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT 72-73 (1970).
72 Cumberland Packing Co., 81 F.T.C. 352 (1972).
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Quaker 100% Natural Cereal is a natural food product, made
from conventionally grown foodstuffs to which no artificial additives
or preservatives have been added.7
No guideline from either the F.T.C. or F.D.A. has been found,
covering the term "natural."
74
Only one F.T.C. complaint has been found which is even remotely
connected with "natural" foods: Cumberland Packing Corporation.75 On
the basis of ad excerpts number (4), and other similar ads, the Commission
found that Cumberland had falsely represented its product, Sugar in
the Raw, as:
(1) an organically grown food;
(2) not a processed food;
(3) a significant source of vitamins and minerals;
(4) substantially different from, or superior to, other sugars because
it does not utilize or contain any chemicals or preservatives.
The claims made in ads (5) and (6) are more elusive. The
Commission, in its discretion, could conceivably interpret the Grape Nuts
representations as false, for a "back to nature" cereal might be defined to
mean that it is not "adulterated," even with additional vitamins. In order
to move against the Alpen Cereal ad (number [6]) the Commission would
have to depart from its traditional focus of inquiry, which has been
whether the representations are actually "true" or "false," and concentrate
on evaluating the very subjective suggestions that are being made.76 Does
this ad play on consumers' needs, fears, or desires in some way? Even if it
does, it might be argued, most other ads do the same thing, to some
degree. Is there any reason why this particular ad should be singled out
for action? The writer believes that it should be, because it probably is
difficult for a consumer, viewing an ad such as Alpen's, to be critical about
what is being suggested to him. A prospective car buyer, to take another
example, would probably not let a glamorous model, or setting, materially
influence him in his final decision of which car he will purchase. A
housewife will not regularly buy a laundry powder simply on the basis of
claims made in ads for it, that the brand advertised will clean clothes
73 The definition would seem to dispel some confusion in the minds of consumers.
Unfortunately, no advertisement has been found which has attempted to define a
"natural food" as comprehensively. It is puzzling to read, in the list of ingredients of
Quaker 100% Natural Cereal, that non-fat dry milk has been added. It is best left to
experts to argue over whether non-fat dry milk is "a conventionally grown foodstuff,"
or, if it is an additive, they can then argue over whether it is "artificial," or "natural."
74 In Wolnak, Health Foods: Natural, Basic, and Organic, 27 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
453 (1972), the author does not refer to any official guidelines for the meaning of
"natural" and "organic." The inference is irresistible, that no official definitions exist
for those terms.
75 81 F.T.C. 352 (1972).
76 See Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, Wisc. L.
REv. 1097 (1972).
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better than other products. The housewife, instead, will decide whether to
buy the product again on the basis of the results she obtained with it. In
both the case of cars and laundry powders, then, the consumer can
critically evaluate what is represented. In the Alpen ad, on the other
hand, consumers are gently soothed with subtle suggestions, against which
they have not developed a high resistance. After eating "adulterated"
foods, a food with "natural goodness," which is "pure and simple,"
"wholesome and satisfying," must appear to be a desirable, healthful
change from the old fare. A consumer can easily confuse the ad's
incantations with representations suggesting that the product actually
contains more nutrients than other foods. There is little for the consumer
to objectively verify, after he has tried the product once, to help him
decide if he should buy it again. The consumer may not so much be
buying a cereal, as much as he is buying an "idea." The ad is unfair, for
those people who cannot understand what exactly is motivating them to
buy the cereal (i.e., are they buying the cereal because they think that
it is nutritionally superior, or are they buying it simply because they
approve of the enticing words and pictures in the promotion?), and
it is false if the implied promise of nutritional benefits is greater than
what the cereal actually provides. These are questions of fact which
the Commission, in its discretion, can determine.7
Further Drug Advertisements:
The Contac ad number (7) appears to be a very clear-cut violation
of the F.T.C. Act. By mentioning ingredients found in competitors'
products, and then emphasizing that they are not found in Contac, it
would seem that there is a failure "to reveal -facts material in the light of
such representations," as well as a failure to indicate the "consequences
which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertise-
ment relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement."7 8
Ordinary consumers do not know what an antitussive, or an analgesic
is. 79 Contac would have us conclude, in our ignorance, that these ingredi-
77 See text accompanying notes 20-48 supra. See also William Freihofer Baking Co. 81
F.T.C. 921 (1972).
78 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).
79An antitussive is a cough suppressant. An analgesic is a pain reliever, and included
in that class would be common aspirin.
In Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972), the F.T.C. complained
that Ocean Spray was confusing customers by using the term "food energy" in place
of the more precise term, calorie. The best rule, obviously, is to require advertisers to
use the terms that will be best understood by consumers. In some instances, it will
be a technical term (i.e. "calorie," in place of "food energy"; "aspirin," in place of
"pain reliever"). In other situations, it will be a generally descriptive term, such
as "cough suppressant," in place of antitussive.
While this Comment was being prepared for publication, Contac has prepared
revised ads, which do not use the objectionable technical terms.
For an amusing judicial discussion of the advisability of using the term "sugar
pill" in place of the term "placebo," see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669,
676 (2d Cir. 1963).
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ents are undesirable in a cold remedy. The ad also seems to constitute a
clear case of an unfair competitive practice against other manufacturers,
since the ad is definitely disparaging competitive products by innuendo. 80
The second Contact ad (number [8]) is included, to suggest how
inconsistent Contac's reasoning about drug ingredients really is. In the
cold remedy ad, it was suggested that the identified but unexplained
"additional" ingredients of the competitors' products were undesirable.
Now, in the allergy ad, we are being told that we should take Contac if
we suffer from hayfever, because, apparently, one of Contac's ingredients
is effective against hayfever symptoms. The fact that seems to be
overlooked is that if only one ingredient is effective against the symptoms,
the other ingredients in Contac become superfluous. They become, really,
much like the competitors' "additional" ingredients in their cold remedies.
The second Contac ad would thus seem to be seriously inconsistent with
the first. If such a practice is not "false," then surely it is unfair.
Ad number (9) improperly suggests that a drug product which
seems to be designed to relieve the symptoms of one kind of ailment,
can also be taken to relieve the symptoms of a different ailment.
Advertising an arthritis remedy as effective against headache pain, it is
submitted, does not "educate" the public in a beneficial way, but may
instead encourage many consumers to misuse drugs inadvertently. Some
viewers may become convinced that any arthritis remedy, even those
prescribed by doctors, is effective against headaches; particularly since
"Arthritis Pain Formula" could be misconstrued to be a generic term,
instead of a brand name. After watching ad number (9), it seems
very possible for an uncritical viewer to give a child a prescription
drug for arthritis, to relieve the child's headache.,
Ad number (10), when compared with (9), involves a situation
which is the opposite of that found in the two Contac ads, for we have
two "different" remedies, one ostensibly formulated to relieve arthritis
pain, while the other is very likely thought of as a headache remedy, now
being advertised for "each other's" ailments. The fact that both products
come from the same manufacturer reinforces the charges that many
manufacturers create the same products, and then make artificial
distinctions between them.n Here, we go a step further, for the "artificial
distinctions" between the products are in effect being destroyed. Such
advertising can only contribute to the general confusion that must exist
in many people's minds about pain relievers, and should be condemned
as "unfair" to consumers under the F.T.C. Act, even if the representations
are not found to be factually false.
8D See text accompanying notes 41-55 supra.
81 See note 22 supra; Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951), and
text accompanying note 40 supra.
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The statement in ad number (9), that "A.P.F. has more pain reliever
than most headache tablets," is descriptively vague. In ad number (7) for
Contac, product ingredients were identified by name, but their effects
were not explained or described. In ad number (10), on the other
hand, we are given a description of an ingredient, and left to guess
its name. The "pain reliever" referred to., presumably, is aspirin, but
advertisers probably avoid identifying it by its most generally understood
name, lest viewers be "misled" into buying plain aspirin instead of the
advertised "combination of ingredients" product.83
There is another potentially dangerous encouragement in ad number
(9), and in most of the ads which follow. This ad, as many other drug
ads, shows one friend suggesting that another take some kind of drug. In
many ads, the friend who is, in effect, "pushing" a certain remedy, may
cite statistics or other information to back up his recommendation, such
as "Phillips is the kind of laxative doctors recommend most often."
Consumers watching television drug ads can generally assume that
information which one "friend" is scripted to pass on to another is
essentially accurate (unless, of course, we have an outright "false" ad!),
but the real danger is that such ads teach consumers to be very
uncritical about the source of their information on drugs. Consumers
should be encouraged to get their information from more reliable
sources than friends. Normally, one would think that a pharmacy
would be such a source, but an ad for Phillips Milk of Magnesia makes
a mockery even out of that suggestion."
Laxatives: Ad number (11), of course, is objectionable from the
standpoint that one friend, again, is "prescribing" a drug to another. But
besides that ad number (11) is highly objectionable, for it is descriptively
vague about the condition that laxatives are designed to treat. Do
euphemisms such as "not in the swing," "out of sorts," "irregular," or
"sourpuss" faithfully convey the impression that a laxative is to be taken
to relieve constipation? It would seem quite reasonable for some viewers to
conclude that such terms also suggest that laxatives are to be taken for
the treatment of other ailments; ailments for which laxatives are not
83 See F.T.C. Proposed Rule of July 5- 1967, supra note 61; see also note 79 supra.
84 In the ad a young girl, apparently just beginning to work at the drugstore, does not
know which laxative to recommend to a customer. A friendly postman walks in, and
advises her to recommend Phillips, for "it's the kind of laxative doctors recommend
most often." Relieved, the girl walks back over to the customer, and recites what she
has just learned. She does not indicate when or how she got the information. The
customer, impressed, buys the Phillips.
The implication of that ad is disturbing, for in it an employee at a drugstore
hears some unverified information about a drug, literally from a man off the street,
and then without attempting to verify it in any way, she passes it on to a customer,
without suggesting how potentially unreliable her source of information is. The
customer is not as critical as she might be, but it is arguable that she should be able
to rely on what she hears about drugs from someone who works at a drugstore.
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designed to be used, such as diarrhea, and "sour" stomach.8 5 These ads, in
effect, dangerously encourage people to self-diagnose a variety of
afflictions as treatable with laxatives.86
Over-the-Counter Sleeping Aids: The last two ads, numbers (12)
and (13), are in the writer's opinion extremely objectionable. They are
undoubtedly designed to encourage people who have not used drugs to
help them get to sleep, to start using such drugs. There is a difference
between encouraging a person who is already taking a drug for an
ailment, to "switch" to another brand, and encouraging a person to
introduce an entirely new kind of drug into his "medicinal diet." That
difference at times may only be theoretical, 87 but these two ads do not
make any pretenses about what they are trying to do: they do not try to
persuade sleeping aid users to "switch" from one brand to another, they
are trying to get non-users "started" on what really is "a whole new thing."
From the "aspirin age" of several decades ago,88 this country has
become plagued with drug excesses of all kinds. It seems to be quite
justifiable to argue that, on account of this, advertisers should not
85 Phillips Milk of Magnesia ads at one time stressed that milk of magnesia is not
only a laxative, but an antacid as well.
86 See Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972), for a case involving the
use of the imprecise euphemism "food energy," in place of the term "calorie."
See also J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965) and Bristol-Myers Co., 74
F.T.C. 780 (1968). in those cases the advertisers were admonished for encouraging
"self-diagnosis" and "self-medication."
The sheer number of laxative ads on television may also have the undesirable
effect of convincing viewers that, with so much promotion, laxatives are to be used by
a great many people fairly often. For example, while in a Phillips ad one friend
phones another saying that, "for the first time in years, I need a laxative," there is
the highly questionable slogan for Ex-Lax which is currently in use: "Everyone needs
help once in a while." Millstein, supra note 29, at 492, observes that the F.T.C. does
not have the power to "regulate the quantity, taste, social values, blatancy, or
frequency of advertising; these are matters with which no federal agency is presently
equipped to deal. A full national debate leading to new legislation is necessary if
these matters are to be controlled."
87 Cigarette advertisers and manufacturers have always insisted that through their ads
they were not trying to encourage anyone to start smoking cigarettes, but, instead, they
were interested in "winning over" people who had already decided to smoke cigarettes.
While that was the theory, it is interesting to recall some of the television
programs which were sponsored by cigarette manufacturers. In the late 1950's,
Marlboro Cigarettes sponsored The Many Loves of Dobie Gillis, a program which
obviously appealed to younger viewers. A more callous example is Winston Cigarettes'
sponsorship of the popular animated series, The Flintstones. On the Flintstone shows,
unlike the Dobie Gillis series, the program characters actually did ads for cigarettes.
It is difficult even to begin to imagine what sort of impact animation of "Fred" and
'Wilma" shown smoking, and extolling the virtues of Winston Cigarettes, would have
on countless young viewers.
In radio days listeners were encouraged to start smoking with such "match-ups"
as Camel Cigarettes and Benny Goodman, in the late 1930's, and Frank Sinatra and
Chesterfield Cigarettes, in the 1940's.
88 Tm AspntrN Aar (M. Leighton, ed. 1949) is a compilation of entertaining articles
about America in the 1920's and 1930's. The title faithfully conveys the impression of
a nation moving into a "higher gear." As the more frantic pace created new "head-
gches" for people, they turmed more and more to their aspirin bottles to find relief.
[V'd1. 8S
21
Donner: Advertising of Food and Drugs
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
Spring, 1975]
be permitted to inundate the airwaves and periodicals with suggestions
that people can solve more problems by taking more drugs.
The Sominex ads (number [12]) seem to be trying to sell viewers on
the idea that it is not alarming for ordinary people to take drugs in order
to get to sleep. The ads seem to stress wholesome people in wholesome
surroundings encouraging each other to "pop" a Sominex at bedtime. No
individual in any of the recent ads that were viewed had a word of caution
to say about the practice, except to mention that Sominex is fine to take
when one has "occasional" trouble. In the Sleep-Eze ad (number [13]), it
is stated, "If you have occasional trouble [getting to sleep], then perhaps
you'd like to know about Sleep-Eze." The dangerous omission in such a
statement is, how often is occasional? Both ads seem to leave that question
for viewers to decide themselves. In effect, the ads are encouraging
viewers to self-diagnose what is an "occasional" sleeping problem, and
then self-prescribe an over-the-counter drug for its treatment. 89
The Sominex ad was found objectionable for not explicitly warning
viewers that their insomnia might need a doctor's attention. Sleep-Eze, on
the other hand, explicitly warns viewers at the beginning of its ad. Is the
ad thereby made preferable over the Sominex ad? This writer's answer is
that the Sleep-Eze ad ranks among the worst of all the ads considered, for
it seems to motivate people to buy out of fear. What the copywriters have
cleverly done, is to turn a desirable "affirmative disclosure" about the
potential seriousness of a sleeping problem, into a very devious scare
tactic.9 The warning comes at the beginning of the ad. It is reasonable to
assume that such an alarming statement will immediately draw the
attention of a viewer who has been experiencing great difficulty in
sleeping; the kind of person who should really see his doctor instead of his
pharmacist, for a non-prescription sleeping aid. Once that suffering
person's attention has been gotten, on comes the "soft sell" for Sleep-Eze.
The ad encourages the viewer to downplay the potential seriousness
of his insomnia, by suggesting to him, that if he has only "occasional"
trouble, he may not need to see a doctor, after all, for Sleep-Eze is
89 See J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965); see also Bristol-Myers Co., 74 F.T.C.
780 (1968).90 In J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 542 (1965), the F.T.C. considered a drug ad
which advised "check with your doctor":
Despite respondent's argument to the contrary, we find that the implication in
their advertising that a person can self-diagnose a deficiency of iron from his
tiredness symptoms is not dispelled by the phrase "check with your doctor." In
the first place the word "check" suggests that the viewer go to the doctor only
to verify a condition that he is quite capable of recognizing himself. Moreover,
this phrase is usually followed by another statement which completely obscures
its meaning, such as "check with your doctor, and if you've been feeling
wornout, because of iron-poor blood-take GERITOL" On the interpretation
most favorable to respondents, this advertising suggests that the tired viewer
have his condition checked by a doctor, and then treat himself according to a
television statement. We fail to see how this unlikely suggestion clarifies the
meaning of the advertisement.
See also Bristol-Myers Co., 74 F.T.C. 780 (1968).
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available without a prescription. If a person is given a choice in diagnosing
the seriousness of his problem, will he choose the more or less
alarming alternative? It is not very much different from giving an
overindulgent drinker the choice of describing himself as an "alcoholic,"
or as a "social drinker." In the case of an insomniac, the best way
for him to reenforce his hope and belief that his problem is not
serious, is for him to buy Sleep-Eze.
CONCLUSION
The advertising improprieties discussed in this comment seem to
suggest that ads should satisfy four requirements:
(1) Representations and Disclosures: When an ad makes representa-
tions, they must be accurate and complete. Certain disclosures may be
required in ads for some kinds of products.
Representations obviously should be accurate, and they should be
complete, to avoid any possible misunderstandings. While it has been
suggested that "each consumer be provided not only with the truth, but
with enough information on which to base an intelligent and informed
decision," 9' this writer believes that a requirement to disclose such
"useful" information should depend upon the kind of product advertised.
With some products, it is difficult to imagine what sort of disclosures
could be made, to help consumers make "rational" evaluations of them.
One example to consider would be the advertising of potato chips. Such
a "snack" or "junk" food was never meant to be bought for "rational"
or "intelligent" reasons. The advertiser should thus be permitted to use
"irrational" promotional techniques in potato chip ads, such as enticing
pictures and jingles, attractive settings, layouts, models, and contagious
humor, as long as consumers are not misled by the ads (misled, for
example, into believing that potato chips are nutritionally valuable), and
as long as there are no problems in the ads, as illustrated in the three
remaining categories. Ads for products such as drugs, on the other hand,
can involve certain dangers, which justify the inclusion of warnings. For
example, an ad which would simply state, "Brand-X Sleeping Potion is
now available at your favorite drugstore," makes no representations about
the product, which might be said to require further elaboration, but it
seems appropriate to require such affirmative disclosures as "Check with
your doctor," and "Observe label directions."
(2) Understanding the Representations or Suggestions: The ordinary
consumer must be able to understand, from an ad, the meaning or
significance of the representations or suggestions.
An "accurate and complete" representation can be as misleading and
91 See Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., 26 FooD
DRUG CosM. LJ. 487, 489 (1971). See also Thain, Food Advertising: The F.T.C. Past
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harmful as an outright "false" representation, if the consumer cannot
understand its meaning or significance. The distinction between this
requirement and the first requirement will not always -be well defined,
since a consumer may not understand an advertiser's representations,
because they are "incomplete." This second requirement covers ads in
which the information is provided, but no conclusion from the information
is drawn. For example, the breakfast cereal ads "accurately and
completely" describe some of their ingredients, but the ads fail to indicate
to consumers why it is good for them to eat cereal with such "natural"
ingredients. The ad for Excedrin (ad number [1]), however, offers the
conclusion that it is "more effective against pain," without providing
appropriate preceding representations to warrant such a conclusion. Thus
the Excedrin ad, unlike the cereal ads, is not "accurate and complete" in
its representations, and it comes under the first category.
(3) Understanding the Reason for Buying: The ordinary consumer
must be able to understand, from an ad, why exactly he may be
motivated to buy the product.
This category deals with subtle suggestions in ads, which consumers
may not consciously perceive, which persuade them to buy products. The
Alpen ad (ad number 16]) is a good example of this. The Sleep-Eze ad
(ad number [13]) seems to qualify, too, with its skillfully understated use
of fear, to motivate purchases. The F.T.C. has only begun to explore
"psychological advertising," and this field deserves more detailed consider-
ation by legal writers.92 It is sufficient to say that a consumer has a right
to choose freely between products, and in order for him to be able to
choose freely, he must be able to understand how advertisers may be
attempting to persuade him. A consumer should be able to evaluate ads
critically, and should not be victimized 'by skillful advertisers who may be
able to plant persuasive suggestions in his less critical subconscious mind.
(4) "Fairness and Ethics:" An ad should not use "un/air" practices,
nor "encourage" consumers in questionable ways.
This broad category takes in such things as unfair competitive
practices, and questionable encouragements. This comment has found
a variety of appalling suggestions made in ads:
(a) A "stronger" drug is a "better" drug (ad [2]).
(b) One can safely rely on friends' advice about drugs (ads [9],
[11], and [12]).
(c) One can, in effect, solve more problems by taking more drugs
(ad number [12]).
(d) One can safely determine, alone, whether a sleeping problem is
serious enough to warrant a doctor's treatment (ad number [13]).
92See Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, WIsc. L.
Rev. 1097 (1972). See also Pollay, supra note 1.
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(e) Any vague sort of reference to a hospital, clinical, or university
study guarantees that a product is reliable, and is probably preferable to
other, similar products (ads [1], and [13]).
In closing, it is worth reiterating that since food and drugs have the
potential of injuring health, instead of simply causing financial injury,
increased vigilance of food and drug advertising is justified. Consumers
have a right to be told more than they have been told about the
products they ingest.
BARRY S. DONNER
EXPUNGEMENT IN OHIO: ASSIMILATION INTO
SOCIETY FOR THE FORMER CRIMINAL
I. INTRODUCTION
T HAS ONLY BEEN within the last 50 years that there has been official
recognition of the debilitating legal and social consequences that result
from a citizen's arrest and conviction. Legally imposed restrictions and
the social stigma concomitant with a criminal record effectively operate
to penalize ex-convicts even after they have paid their "debt" to society.
A person with merely an arrest record suffers damage to reputation,
impeachment as a witness, disabilities in acquiring schooling and
professional licenses, more intense police scrutiny, and direct economic
losses.' Consequences of a criminal conviction are more severe.
2
Most criminal records are available to the general public; which
fact gives rise to many of the consequences attendant to conviction of a
crime. In recognition of this fact, several state legislatures have enacted
laws commonly termed "expungement statutes."'3 These statutes seek to
go beyond mere sentence and imprisonment in dealing with the problem
of the criminal offender's relationship with society:
Expungement and annulment are the product of the recent emphasis
in corrections on rehabilitation. Both kinds of statutes are designed
to restore forfeited rights and uplift the offender's status by
I Menard v. Mitchell, 420 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2 A concise examination is found in Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WAH. U.L.Q.
147, 150-62 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gough]. For an exhaustive study, see Special
Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv.
929 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
3 The use of the word "expungement" to describe these statutes is somewhat of a
misnomer. To expunge "means to destroy or obliterate; it implies... a physical
annihilation." BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 693 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). None of the statutes
call for actual destruction of records.
[Val. 8:3
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